Make some noise!
Several days after being placed on house arrest, Gabon’s frail wide-eyed president Ali Bongo, 64, stared into a camera and pleaded to the international community to “make noise” about the 30 August military coup. Many Gabonese citizens did, although they had a more humours take on the situation than what he had hoped.
The response to Bongo’s pleas by Gabonese nationals in the diaspora and the celebrations on the streets of the capital Libreville following the coup underscores the deep lying frustrations with the perceived illegitimate government of Bongo. The putsch came hours after he had been declared the winner of a disputed presidential election during which he shut down the internet and implemented a night-time curfew, ostensibly to curb election related violence.
The rebellion in Gabon was hard on the heels of the 26 July coup in Niger and came as a surprise to many observers, provoking panicked reactions from diplomats, the business community and investors. Much like with the coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea and Niger, many Western media outlets were quick to point to the anti-French sentiment and the government’s relationship with the France as the reason for the coup in Gabon.
However, blaming France is short-sighted. It reeks of lazy analysis and over emphasises the role of external actors in countries with complex domestic political dynamics. While France’s Françafrique policies – like the return of low-rise jeans – is certainly problematic, it is not the sole reason for the spate of coups in its former colonies.
The removal of Bongo, the ninth successful putsch in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the 10th attempt/plot since 2020, has stirred whispers of the “coup contagion”. As the “overthrow your government by military force” TikTok challenge spreads across Central and West Africa we’re left with the burning question: “coup’s next?”
Where to begin
Before trying to figure out who’s next we need to know what to look out for. In the pursuit of understanding what causes coup d’états, political science scholars have identified factors known as “permissive preconditions” and “precipitating conditions” to describe the factors and events that contribute to military rebellions.
Permissive preconditions refer to fundamental underlying factors within a country’s political, social or economic landscape that creates an environment conducive to a military coup. Permissive preconditions include factors such as high levels of poverty and unemployment, a leadership vacuum, weak institutions, poor governance, public dissatisfaction over corruption, high levels of insecurity and the politicisation of the military – basically when sh*t goes south (hitting close to home?).
These preconditions may not directly cause a coup but it does make it more likely to occur by weakening civilian institutions, fostering discontent and providing the military with incentives or opportunities to seize power.
Most countries in SSA have many of the aforementioned permissive preconditions present and the degree to which these factors impact a country differs from state to state. The presence of multiple or all permissive preconditions does not indicate that a coup will take place in a country, although these factors drive instability risks and will likely place pressure on the ruling government, increasing the risk of coups. Much like hearing the “it’s lit” ad-lib doesn’t mean you’ll be listening to a Travis Scott song, but certainly it does increase the risk that you’ll be listening to four-minutes of auto-tune nightmare fuel.
Meanwhile, precipitating conditions are essentially triggers or large political, economic or security developments that triggers a coup. Like in Bongo’s case, being declared the winner of a fraudulent election was seemingly the straw that broke the camels back. These precipitating conditions are usually more difficult to identify and require detailed examination to lead to accurate predictions.
Okay, so coup’s next?
The rebellion in Gabon stemmed from mounting discontent directed at the ruling Bongo dynasty – which ruled Gabon for over 50 years. The regime was widely criticised for being undemocratic and corrupt, leveraging its influence on state institutions and the security apparatus to ensure that it remained in power.
The resilience of former president Bongo’s government was closely tied to the loyalty of the nation’s armed forces. Against the backdrop of growing popular dissatisfaction, the military junta exploited the administration’s dependency on the military to seize control and the Bongo regime’s longstanding influence over state institutions proved insufficient to deter a military intervention.
When evaluating the interplay between governance systems, state repression and civil-military relations, a handful of African countries share similarities with Gabon. Notably, fellow members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), including Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and the Republic of Congo, present analogous traits. Collectively, the administrations led by figures like Cameroon’s Paul Biya (90), Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang (81), and Republic of Congo’s Denis Sassou-Nguesso (79) have collectively governed for 123 years.
These enduring authoritarian regimes are marred by pervasive corruption and a calculated reliance on highly politicised military apparatuses. President Biya’s decades-long rule in Cameroon has been marked by political repression and centralised control, facilitated by a military loyal to his regime. However, the ongoing Anglophone crisis in the North-West and South-West regions, coupled with the persistent Boko Haram insurgency in the Far North, could further exacerbate the government’s vulnerability. The lack of a coherent strategy to address these protracted conflicts could leave the military frustrated at the nonagenarian (I had to look that one up) heightening the risks to President Biya’s grip on power.
Equatorial Guinea’s Obiang similarly leverages vast oil wealth to sustain his authoritarian grip, relying on a politicised military to suppress opposition and secure his hold on power. In the Republic of Congo, of the country’s six post-independence presidents, four have been ousted by a rebellion or civil war. With the security sector dominating the political space, successive regimes have been reluctant to establish independent political institutions that could help build a robust civil society.
In these nations, akin to the Gabonese scenario, the longevity of these regimes hinges not on the strength of their respective political institutions but rather on the strength and whim of their armed forces. This dynamic renders them highly susceptible to the whims and influence of their military establishments.
Coup leaders can’t be worse than my government.
Yes. Yes, they are. Recent precedent has shown that having the military in charge of the government is akin to having that one uncle who’s not allowed to drink too much at Christmas lunch suddenly become president. Things go from bad to worse and quickly.
Take Burkina Faso, for instance. Facing one of the most severe Islamic militancy insurgencies on the continent, the country witnessed not one, but two military coups in January and September 2022. These coups only exacerbated an already dire security situation. Unsurprisingly, since these coups, the number of casualties from militant Islamist violence in the country has nearly tripled compared to the preceding 18 months. The spread of extremist activities, now encroaching upon the capital, Ouagadougou, has pushed Burkina Faso to the brink of collapse.
In such scenarios, where military regimes hold absolute power with no checks and balances, impunity reigns. Mali, another nation that fell victim to coups in August 2020 and May 2021, bears witness to this. The military government, in collaboration with Russian mercenary forces from the Wagner Group, has faced allegations from the UN of killing over 500 civilians – the vast majority of whom were summarily executed – during a security operation in the village of Moura in the Mopti Region between 27 -31 March 2022.
Mass murder, weaponised rape and human rights violations aside, coups also exact a significant economic cost on a country. A study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) from July highlights the substantial economic consequences. It estimated that Guinea’s 2008 coup and another in Mali in 2012 collectively drained a staggering sum of US$12bln to US$13.5bln from the two nations’ economies over a five-year period. To put it into perspective, this accounted for 76 per cent of Guinea’s 2008 GDP and nearly half of Mali’s 2012 GDP, as calculated by the study.
Impunity reigns
Since the spate of coups began in Mali in 2020, not one country has returned to civilian rule. The recent spate of coups across the continent and the perceived lack of consequences for the putschists have seemingly emboldened military leaders to overthrow their respective governments, as post-coup responses by regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) provides a cue to future plotters.
Since these regional bodies demonstrates an unwillingness or an inability to successfully implement sufficient costs on coup leaders as to make a putsch undesirable, the international community will continue to lose its ability to deter putschists.
So, get your tripod ready and make sure you have your choreographed dance routine memorised so that you can make some noise for the next deposed sad sack.
YouTube video uploaded after the article.
